Why Shklar’s liberalism of fear is a useful contemporary theory

In 1989, Judith Shklar proposed a uniek defence for liberalism in The Liberalism of Fear. This is a defence of liberalism that does not start at a summum bonum, as most defences of liberalism do, but at a summum malum. This means that instead of arguing for the hypothetical ideal of liberalism, Shklar defends liberalism by arguing that it is a political defence against the evil and cruelty of history's concentrations of power. She argues that it is the fear of the possibility of evil and cruelty in concentrations of power that is the biggest political motivator for the liberal. However, today, Western societies have become mostly peaceful. The thoughts of the evils and cruelties of the great wars and totalitarianism have been fading and the cold war has become but a memory. Thus, since evil and cruelty in our societies are mostly gone, does this mean that the liberalism of fear that starts at a summum malum is also becoming a theory of the past? 

This paper argues that it is not. More specifically, with an analysis of today's COVID-19 policies implemented by some of the Western governments, I will argue that the liberalism of fear will always be a useful contemporary theory. I will do this by arguing first that starting at a summum malum will always be useful in political theory. Second, I will show that liberalism's best defence against a summum malum in concentrations of power is a clearly defined political line between the power of the private and the power of the public. More specifically, if this line becomes foggy, or is consciously blurred, fear of a summum malum is politically useful for the liberal. Finally, I will analyse how the liberalism of fear is a useful contemporary theory to understand a part of the pushback against the current COVID-19 policies in Western democracies. 

Start at a summum malum 

A summum malum is the greatest possible evil. This is where the liberalism of fear starts. It starts with the acknowledgement that history shows that evil is a reality. A short—let alone a deep—reading of 20st century history shows that where power has been concentrated, that power has more often than not been misused in the form of cruelty and evil. Cruelty is a form of evil that is arbitrary, unlicenced or an unnecessary act of force (Sklar 1989, 29). Originally, such power was mostly concentrated in the church and liberalism of fear was born out of the overreaching public authority of the churches in post-Reformation Europe (Shklar 1989, 23).

The bloody public wars that the churches were fighting did not mirror the toleration of most private individuals and families. They started to insist that the individual must make their own choices in life without the interference from public authority because they started to realise that a forced belief is in itself a false belief (Shklar 1989, 23). Therefore, liberalism of fear is the liberalism that defends liberalism on the basis that the private should always be fearful of concentrations of power because they lead to coercion and forced beliefs and this in turn leads to cruelty and evil. 

In contemporary Western democracies, concentrations of power are mostly found in governments with monopolies on physical power. The liberal believes that government is a necessary evil for the protection of both the private and public (Shklar 1989, 29). This means that we cannot do without government, but that it at the same time is a concentration of power for which individuals should be existentially fearful. The liberalism of fear argues that we should in fact be fearful because the evils of the extremes of both the political left and right in the form of the Nazi's and the Soviets are a stark historical reality. However, today, we mostly live in peaceful societies. Wars are at an all time low and truly evil regimes are sparse and condemned by most countries of the world. It is therefore a fair question whether a theory that defends liberalism by starting at a summum malum is not largely overreaching in contemporary peaceful democracies. 

However, I will defend that it is not. As Shklar (1989, 22) writes, "Anyone who thinks that fascism in one guise or another is dead and gone ought to think again." Even in our society, we see the temptations of fashist collectivist thought and action in identity politics and collectivist thinking both at the right and at the left of the political spectrum. If there was no eternal temptation to participate in such thought and action, people historically would not have done it. Therefore, I argue that the liberalism of fear accepts this temptation to be an existential truth in society. This is what the start at a summum malum in the liberalism of fear means. It is the fear that each and every generation again has the potential to slide down the path towards evil and cruel concentrations of power and each generation again has to bar itself against the ever rejuvenating temptations of such action. For the liberalism of fear, it therefore does not necessarily matter to what degree we are a society that is full of cruelty and evil. What matters is that we should always be fearful of the existential possibility that our relatively peaceful democracies could still in fact become something closely resembling a summum malum, and that political action and policy often brings us either towards or away from it. As Shklar (1989, 22) writes, liberalism has been the historical exception, evil and cruel societies have always been the norm. Even today, freedom is rare and should be

celebrated. This is because our modern democracies are not mostly characterised by cruelty from its concentrations of power and this absence of evil in society is what the liberalism of fear has historically been trying to defend. This concludes that the liberalism of fear has historical justification to start at the existential reality that societies eternally have the possibility of becoming something resembling a summum malum of society. 

'The line' as a political defence against summum malum 

Thus, liberalism of fear starts with the existential reality that society could become something resembling a summum malum. What follows is the realisation that a political defence is needed against any concentration of power to prevent it from becoming evil and cruel. The liberalism of fear suggests that this political defence has to be a clearly defined line that separates the power of the private and the power of the public. This line restricts the powerful from infringement upon the weak. It restricts the powerful from the practice of arbitrary, unnecessary and unlicenced acts of force. In this way, the sum of all individual private power is a counter balance to the necessary evil of the concentration of public power most often in the form of government. 

But most importantly, for the liberal, it is not so much important where the line is drawn, as that it is drawn (Shklar 1989, 24). The line itself is the line that lets both the powerful and the weak know when the powerful overstep their necessary concentration of power. When the line is overstepped, the sum of the weaker private power becomes strong together and could step in as a counterbalance against the powerful. However, when this line is not crystally clear defined, no one exactly knows when this line is crossed. For the sake of "public health, public affairs, or public safety", the powerful can keep shifting the line that is blurry towards an increasing concentration of power. If this is the case, there is no defined end to the shifting of the line. From the perspective of the public, more concentration of power can always be beneficial for safety and public health. As a trade off, the private will have to keep giving up their power for the benefit of the public. I contend that this is what brings up fear in the liberal. Therefore, this is the reason that the line between the weak and the powerful has to be defined crystally clear. It is not that much of importance where the line is placed, as much as it is important for both the private and the public to clearly understand when the line of power is crossed. 

Therefore, I argue that what is most important for the liberalism of fear is that when the line of power becomes foggy through political action, policy change, or if the line is consciously blurred by the powerful, fear for history's evil and cruelty is aroused in the

liberal. He instantly realises the possibility of his society becoming something akin to a summum malum which we have seen has been the historical existential norm, rather than the exception. Thus, I contend that against the existential possibility of society becoming a summum malum, the liberalism of fear will always demand a clearly defined political line that divides power between the private and the public. If this rule is broken and the line becomes foggy or blurred, a justifiable historical fear is aroused in the liberal that will demand its concentration of power to clearly redefine the end of its power. 

The usefulness of the liberalism of fear in COVID-19 policy 

This understanding of Shklar's liberalism of fear, I argue, can help us understand some of the fear for contemporary COVID-19 policy. On 19 December 2021, the Dutch government announced its second COVID-19 lockdown. At that point, the world has been nearly two years into the COVID-19 pandemic and during this time period, nearly all Western governments have been struggling with COVID-19 rules and mandates. For example, mandatory masks inside public buildings have been 'the new normal', in some countries even outside. Mandatory QR codes for places such as bars and restaurants have been in. Travel bans across the world, and in some countries even (indirect) mandatory vaccination. Some Western democracies have stricter mandates such as Australia and Israel, and others have been following more liberal mandates. The Netherlands can be characterised as following median mandate policy relative to Western democracies. 

For our purposes, it is important to note that these rules and lines have been shifting since the start of the pandemic. To name a few, in some countries, constitutions have been changed so that the use of masks in public could be mandated. Governments (e.g. the US Biden administration) are working to implement mandatory vaccination in companies with over a hundred employees. The right to peaceful protest has been smashed at some points during the pandemic, and vaccines have increasingly become more mandatory in general. Therefore, the question for many people has become: where and when do the mandates stop? This, I contend, is of most importance to the liberal. The point is not to argue for or against the efficiency of those mandates. The point I am trying to make is that the line between the power of the private and the public has been consistently shifting with its COVID-19 policy without a clearly defined line of where the concentration of power in our government cannot exercise power under any condition. 

In other words, where is the line? I contend that this has been unclear. We have not consciously and clearly defined a line that clearly informs both the government, and the

private, where the power of government stops. This line in the COVID-19 pandemic has been shifting and no defined line of power is put in place that restricts the government from further increasing COVID-19 mandates. As I have argued, to the liberal, what is most important is that this arouses historical fear. It arouses fear because to the liberal it opens the existential likelihood of concentrations of power to become something resembling a summum malum if such boundaries are not clearly defined. Thus, for the liberalism of fear, it does not primarily matter to what degree COVID-19 policies are in fact beneficial to public health. Its primary position is that society has to be protected from the existential possibility that policies and political actions could bring society towards a summum malum. Therefore, Shklar's liberalism of fear helps us understand that the fear for COVID-19 policies is historically both understandable and justifiable to the liberal. 

Conclusion 

Some of the societal response to contemporary COVID-19 policies is understandable and justifiable when analysed through Shklar's liberalism of fear. The liberal of fear starts at the existential truth of the eternal possibility of society becoming something akin to a summum malum. It is deeply aware that freedom from evil and cruelty in concentrations of power has been a modern exception, not the historical norm. The liberalism of fear is always fearful of this potential and has proposed a political defence to shield itself from the fear of evil and cruelty. This defence is a clearly defined line between the power of the private and the power of the public. As long as this line is clear and defined, fear in the liberal is restrained. However, when the line becomes foggy or is consciously blurred, fear is justifiably aroused. Moreover, I have suggested that today's COVID-19 policies in many Western democracies have become foggy and unclearly defined, blurring the line between the power of the private and the power of the public. The liberal demands the return of a clear line to shield itself from the fear of the existential positility of concentrations of power to become evil or cruel. This explains the arousement of fear in the modern liberal who now demands the return of a clear political line to define the end of public power in COVID-19 policy.

Bibliography 

Shklar, Judith. (1989), “The Liberalism of Fear.” In Liberalism and the Moral Life, edited by Nancy L. Rosenblum,